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Abstract 
The logic of cooperation substantiates the strategic powers of the public agents and their coalitions, thus bringing contribution 
to understanding the political mechanisms which determine the public decision. The public bodies, derived from a process of 
political choice turn into account the logic of cooperation in view to establish own managerial structures. In most situations, 
the political cooperation will represent a consequence of negotiation, based on political programmes, their compatibility as 
well as the voting power of the actors/political agents. The political market will represent the support of political cooperation 
and public decision, thus contributing to understanding of social phenomena such as the political or electoral ones. The current 
paper aims to emphasise the logical mechanisms of public decision in the context of the necessity to create post electoral 
coalitions, aimed at maximization of the impact of political options of the electorate. The empirical examples will refer to the 
recent local elections in Bucharest Municipality. The main 
results will substantiate a theoretical framework aimed to highlight the logical and systemic connections of public decision 
with the political market.The research methods will take into consideration both documentation and theoretical analysis, 
empirical research, modelling and statistic interpretation. 
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1. Introduction 
The paper aims to emphasise the logical mechanisms of public decision, in the context of the necessity to 
create  post-electoral coalitions, aimed at maximization of the impact of the political options of electorate. The 
empirical examples refer to the local elections on 10 June 2012 in Bucharest Municipality (Romania). The 
results are substantiating a theoretical framework aimed to highlight the logical and systemic connections of the 
public decision with the political market. The research methods take into consideration documentation and 
theoretical analysis, empirical research and statistic interpretation. 
In view to emphasise the importance of logics of cooperation in public decision making, I presented a real 
example, calculating the values of a series of three indices concerning the power of political agents (alliances or 
political parties), to decide by vote: Penrose Index or Absolute Banzhaf Index, Normalized Banzhaf Index and  
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Shapley  Shubik Index.  
Within the example, there were calculated values of those three indices at the level of the six  Sector Councils 
of  Bucharest Municipality, after the local elections on 10 June 2012, both in decision making with absolute 
majority  (50% + 1 of the total number of local councillors) and for the decisions which require qualified majority 
(2/3 of the total number of local councillors). Within the example, a series of comparisons between those indices 
are  presented. 
2. Logic of cooperation in public decision making 
Cooperation represents a major problem in different fields, such as: informatics, economics, but also in certain 
social sciences. The specialty literature shows that there are different situation in which coalitions are made, 
communal council, cannot elect the vice-mayor alone, but if they ally to vote with the local counselors of party 
because together they can obtain much better results than individually.  
T. Kotarbinscki defines a generic cooperation relationship between individuals, such as the term cooperation 
also embraces the relationships of hindering or prevention in executing an action by one agent against another. 
Thus defined, the term cooperation is the same thing with the exercise of an influence by one individual over the 
activity of another individual. Kotarbinski, T., 1976. (p. 125).  
The vote represents the center of democracy, from the election of the chess club president to the Parliamentary 
elections. Therefore, the correct and non  manipulative procedures of the vote are very important. Still, a 
correctness and efficiency of the vote, but also in other procedures of social choice. All voting procedures that 
developed throughout more than two centuries have disadvantages. He states that the social processes can be 
analyzed with logics derived from the formal methods used in computer science, including here the Logic of 
winner Kenneth J. Arrow demonstrated it is to be desired that a reasonable voting system must take into account 
five properties; no voting method will ever satisfy these properties, thus destroying a dream of social 
philosophers. Such a property is that the result of the vote should not depend exclusively on the voting behavior 
of a single individual. Another aspect is the exclusion of the "strategic vote", in case that, for example, one group 
can prevent the adoption of a law by means of a vote which is not according to the own preferences, but, in this 
way, the voting process will not reach any decision. Henk, N. 2002. (p 32).  
 
written by: Cornel Popa. Popa, C. Coordinator. 1983. 
 
2.1. Voting power 
An important problem that was presented within the paper is the voting power and, implicitly, the voting 
decision power. 
Intuitively, says Adrian Miroiu, the voting power of parties, states, shareholders etc. differs, as the number of 
votes they have is different. Miroiu, A. 2007. (p 87).  
f an actor or agent is not the number of votes, but 
what he can do with those votes; hence, how he can use them in order to enter a winning coalition. Therefore, the 
voting power of an actor or agent will depend on the number or weight of the winning coalitions that he is part of 
(if each actor has the same number of votes  hence, in the general way, the rule of aggregation of individual 
preferences to which one resorts has the property of anonymity  then this number and the respective weight are 
identica
a winning coalition or not (in fact, the group of all actors is a winning coalition  and from here derives that each 
actor will have a cert
coalition is essential or not; if that coalition remains winning or not even if the respective actor is eliminated from 
Miroiu, A. 2007. (pp 90 - 91).  
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It will be more appropriate to consider that the voting power is the ability of a legislator or deliberator 
(Parliamentarian or local counselor), by means of his vote, to affect whether a measure is passed or not. This 
ability depends, in turn, on a number of complex factors, including the total votes allocated to each individual 
representative, the distribution of votes among the other legislators, the total number of members of a certain 
Banzhaf, J., F. 1965  (p 318). 
Let us assume a real example of the Local Councils of the sectors of Bucharest Municipality, after the local 
elections on 10 June 2012, their regime being regulated by the Law no. 64/2004, for electing the authorities of 
local public administration (local councils, county councils, mayors and presidents of county councils) 
republished, with further amendments. The number of councillors for the local and county councils is established 
by Order of Prefect, according to the provisions of Law no. 215/2001, republished.  
According to the advertisement of the Electoral Bureau of  constituency no. 42 of Bucharest Municipality, on  
13.06.2012, the following political formations have obtained mandates of councillors in the sector local councils: 
USL (Social Liberal Union comprising the Social Democrat Party and the Center Right Alliance composed of the  
National Liberal Party and Conservatory Party), PDL (Democrat Liberal Party), PP  DD (Party of the People  
Dan Diaconescu) and UNPR (National Union for the Progress of  Romania). 
The distribution of the mandates on political formations (alliances or political parties) is presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Synoptic table regarding the composition of the Local Council of the sectors within the City of Bucharest  
Parties/ 
Alliances 
Local Council 
Sector 1 
Local Council 
Sector 2 
Local Council 
Sector 3 
Local Council 
Sector 4 
Local Council 
Sector 5 
Local Council 
Sector 6 
USL 19 14 20 20 18 18 
PDL 5 5 7 4 5 6 
PP - DD 3 3 4 3 4 3 
UNPR 0 5 0 0 0 0 
Total mandates 27 mandates 27 mandates 31 mandates 27 mandates 27 mandates 27 mandates 
 
In a first stage we shall calculate Penrose Index for decision-making (adopting the Decisions by the respective 
Local Council) with absolute majority of 50% + 1 of the total number of local councillors (Table 1), afterwards 
the share is changed to 2/3 of the total number of local councillors (Table 3), as there are situations where the 
decisions in order to be valid require a qualified majority (as mandatory rule of decision). 
Table 2. Penrose index computed at the level of the six local councils of the City of Bucharest for a share of  50% + 1  
Parties/ 
Alliances 
Local Council 
Sector 1 
Local Council 
Sector 2 
Local Council 
Sector 3 
Local Council 
Sector 4 
Local Council 
Sector 5 
Local Council 
Sector 6 
USL 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
PDL 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
PP - DD 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
UNPR   0,00         
Share 50% + 1 Share = 14 Share = 14 Share = 16 Share = 14 Share = 14 Share = 14 
 
  
 
Source: Advertisement, Electoral Bureau of the Constituency  no. 42 Bucharest Municipality, on 13.06.2012. available at 
http://www4.pmb.ro//wwwt/bem_2012/docs/Anunt_20120613.pdf, accessed on 20.09.2012; 
The calculations were achieved using the algorithms proposed by Leech., D.,  See http://www.warwick.ac.uk/~ ecaae/ipdirect.html, accessed 
on  21.09.2012; 
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Table 3. Penrose index computed at the level of the six Local Council of the City of Bucharest for a share of 2/3  
Parties/ 
Alliances 
Local Council 
Sector 1 
Local Council 
Sector 2 
Local Council 
Sector 3 
Local Council 
Sector 4 
Local Council 
Sector 5 
Local Council 
Sector 6 
USL 1,00 0,75 0,75 1,00 1,00 1,00 
PDL 0,00 0,25 0,25 0,00 0,00 0,00 
PP - DD 0,00 0,00 0,25 0,00 0,00 0,00 
UNPR   0,25         
Share 2/3 Share = 18 Share = 18 Share = 21 Share = 18 Share = 18 Share = 18 
       
In Tables 4 and 5 there are presented values of the relative voting power index for agents in six sector local 
councils, firstly for the share of 50% + 1 of the total number of local councillors (absolute majority - Table 4), 
afterwards the share being changed to 2/3 of the total number of local councillors (qualified majority  Table 5). 
 
Table 4. The normalized Banzhaf index, computed at the level of the six Local Councils of the City of Bucharest for a share of  50% + 1  
 
Parties/ 
Alliances 
Local Council 
Sector 1 
Local Council 
Sector 2 
Local Council 
Sector 3 
Local Council 
Sector 4 
Local Council 
Sector 5 
Local Council 
Sector 6 
USL 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
PDL 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
PP - DD 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
UNPR   0,00         
Share 50% + 1 Share = 14 Share = 14 Share = 16 Share = 14 Share = 14 Share = 14 
 
Table 5. The normalized Banzhaf index, computed at the level of the six Local Councils of the City of Bucharest for a share of  2/3  
 
Parties/ 
Alliances 
Local Council 
Sector 1 
Local Council 
Sector 2 
Local Council 
Sector 3 
Local Council 
Sector 4 
Local Council 
Sector 5 
Local Council 
Sector 6 
USL 1,00 0,60 0,60 1,00 1,00 1,00 
PDL 0,00 0,20 0,20 0,00 0,00 0,00 
PP - DD 0,00 0,00 0,20 0,00 0,00 0,00 
UNPR   0,20         
Share 2/3 Share = 18 Share = 18 Share = 21 Share = 18 Share = 18 Share = 18 
 
Further we shall continue the real example and we shall calculate the value of Shapley  - Shubik Index, at the 
level of the six sector local councils of Bucharest Municipality, firstly for the share of 50% + 1 of the total 
number of local councillors (absolute majority - Table 6), afterwards the share being changed to 2/3 of the total 
number of local councillors (qualified majority  Table 7).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The calculations were achieved using the algorithms proposed by Leech., D.,  See http://www.warwick.ac.uk/~ ecaae/ipdirect.html, accessed 
on 21.09.2012; 
 
 The calculations were achieved using the algorithms proposed by Leech., D.,  See http://www.warwick.ac.uk/~ ecaae/ipdirect.html, accessed 
on 21.09.2012; 
 The calculations were achieved using the algorithms proposed by Leech., D.,  See http://www.warwick.ac.uk/~ ecaae/ipdirect.html, accessed 
on 21.09.2012; 
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Table 6. The Shapley  Shubik index, computed at the level of the six Local Councils of the City of Bucharest for a share of 50% + 1  
 
Parties/ 
Alliances 
Local Council 
Sector 1 
Local Council 
Sector 2 
Local Council 
Sector 3 
Local Council 
Sector 4 
Local Council 
Sector 5 
Local Council 
Sector 6 
USL 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
PDL 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
PP - DD 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
UNPR   0,00         
Share 50% + 1 Share = 14 Share = 14 Share = 16 Share = 14 Share = 14 Share = 14 
 
Table 7. The Shapley  Shubik index, computed at the level of the six Local Councils of the City of Bucharest for a share of  2/3  
 
Parties/ 
Alliances 
Local Council 
Sector 1 
Local Council 
Sector 2 
Local Council 
Sector 3 
Local Council 
Sector 4 
Local Council 
Sector 5 
Local Council 
Sector 6 
USL 1,00 0,67 0,67 1,00 1,00 1,00 
PDL 0,00 0,17 0,17 0,00 0,00 0,00 
PP - DD 0,00 0,00 0,17 0,00 0,00 0,00 
UNPR   0,17         
Share 2/3 Share = 18 Share = 18 Share = 21 Share = 18 Share = 18 Share = 18 
Conclusions 
According to the example, we may conclude that for the decision by vote with absolute majority (50% + 1 of 
the total number of local councillors), since the local elections on 10 June 2012, USL alliance (comprising PSD 
and  PNL + PC) has become a majority actor in the six sector local councils of Bucharest Municipality, the three 
indices (Penrose, normalized Banzhaf and Shapley  - Shubik) calculated having the value of 1, thus  
demonstrating that it can decide alone in those local councils, without requiring the other actors (PDL, PP - DD 
and UNPR), which become dummy in this decisional process, the value of the three indices being 0.  
When the decisions are made by qualified majority, the things are quite different. 
Whenever there is an actor holding a number of mandates of local councillor equal to 2/3 of total mandates, it 
will have the value of the three indices equal to 1. This is the case of USL alliance in the local councils of sectors 
1, 4, 5 and 6, when it can make alone decisions even if a qualified majority is required. 
For the local council of sector 2 of Bucharest Municipality, no actor has 2/3 of the mandates of local 
councillors, so they cannot make alone decisions which require qualified majority, and thus they have to form 
alliances. The possible alliances that may lead to valid decisions (Tables 3, 5 and 7) could be USL and UNPR, or 
USL and PDL, which is less probable. Also in this situation we have an actor, PP  DD, which is dummy in the 
decisional process, having a voting power equal to 0. 
In the local council of sector 3 of al Bucharest Municipality, there is another situation as this sector with larger 
population has 31 local councillors related to 27 local councillors at the other 5 sector local councils. In this case 
there is no actor holding 2/3 of the mandates of local councillors, so they have to form alliances for making 
decisions in situations requiring a qualified majority. The possible alliances are: an alternative comprising USL 
and PP- DD and the second alternative comprising USL and PDL, less probable due to the fact that PDL held the 
power during 2008  2012 (it had 18 mandates from 27) and USL was in opposition. 
According to the calculations, we may remark that in certain cases, even if a certain agent has a small number 
of mandates, it holds a certain voting power and implicitly the power to decide by vote, influencing the public 
decision if it belongs to a winning coalition. In this situation we find the agents PDL or UNPR (each holding a 
 
 The calculations were achieved using the algorithms proposed by Leech, D.,  See http://homepages.warwick.ac.uk/~ ecaae/ssdirect.html, 
accessed on 21.09.2012; 
 The calculations were achieved using the algorithms proposed by Leech, D.,  See http://homepages.warwick.ac.uk/~ ecaae/ssdirect.html, 
accessed on 21.09.2012; 
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number of 5 mandates of local councillor) in the local council of sector 2 of Bucharest Municipality, if any of 
them forms a coalition with USL when the decisions are made with qualified majority. In a similar situation is PP 
 DD and also PDL (with a number of 4, respectively 7 mandates of local councillors) in the local council of 
sector 3 of Bucharest Municipality, if any of them forms alliance with USL when the decisions are made by 
qualified majority.    
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